Chevron Is Dead!
Supreme Court Roundup of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
Today is a good day. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) is overruled.
Chevron Deference is fucking dead!
That’s right, we have the opinion of the court in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v. Department of Commerce.
It’s been some five years now—though it doesn’t feel nearly that long ago— that I began podcasting and writing articles for a handful of organizations. In that time, few subjects have received a more consistent focus for me and from me than speaking out against Chevron Deference.
Furthermore, for almost three years now, I have been following the Loper Bright case out of my own intuition that this case may very well be the one to bring down the doctrine of Chevron Deference. This really feels like the end of an era.
But, without further ado, let’s discuss what it is precisely that this opinion says and what it does.
Just like my previous article, discussing the outcome of SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), this majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice John Roberts and joined by Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett; leaving Justice Kagan to dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.
One thing that has really caught my attention was the quality of the writing of the opinion. Fellow constitutional scholar Josh Blackman has long insisted that Chief Justice John Roberts is the best writer on the Court. I had always remained skeptical of that claim, though I must say between Loper Bright and Jarkesy, I am really starting to wonder if he hasn’t been correct all along.
Just like in Jarkesy, The opinion of the court in Loper Bright is a masterful examination of originalist, textualist and doctrinal sources of law.
He begins with an examination of the facts of the case, noting the Court granted this case on a limited question of whether Chevron v. NRDC should be overruled or clarified. Under Chevron courts have sometimes been required to defer to a “permissible” agency interpretation of the statutes those agencies administer—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently.
This opinion combines two cases, namely Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v. Department of Commerce, because both cases involve interpreting a rule that’s promulgated under the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)— Pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which in turn incorporates the Administrative Procedures Act. In both cases, the lower court’s reviewing this matter applied Chevron’s framework to resolve the cases in question in favor of the government.
To be specific, the NMFS had required herring boats to carry regulatory agency observers on their vessel to collect data and monitor their activities for overfishing. When the program ran out of funding required to pay the salaries of these onboard observers they simply shifted that burden onto the herring industry. Forcing herring fishermen to pay the $700 per day salary of each observer they are forced to carry on their boat. After two federal appeals courts rebuffed challenges to this rule two commercial fishing companies filed a petition for cert, seeking review from the Supreme Court.
After agreeing to take up the appeal, the court would issue the following primary holding:
Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled. Pp. 7-35.[1]
Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear, but envisioned that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 525 (A. Hamilton).
As Chief Justice Marshall declared in the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177.[2]
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedures Act “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in the legislation creating their office. It prescribes procedures for administrative action and delineates the contours of judicial review of such action. As relevant here, the APA specifies that it is to be the Courts and not the agencies to decide “all relevant questions of law”—even those involving ambiguous laws. §706 makes it perfectly clear that agency interpretations of statutes are not entitled to deference according to the plain meaning of its text.
The Court would rule that the deference that Chevron requires in reviewing agency action cannot be squared with the APA. Chevron marked a departure from the traditional judicial approach of independently examining each statute to determine its meaning. Instead, following Chevron’s two-step framework the court would have to defer to the agency if it had “a permissible construction of the statute.”
The Chief notes that the Court initially did not treat Chevron as the watershed decision it was fated to become it didn’t take long for federal courts to routinely invoke its framework as the governing standard involving agency authority. Chevron and the numerous subsequent decisions defied the command of the APA that it is the reviewing court who is to “decide all relevant questions of law”. It requires the court to ignore, rather than follow its own independent judgement as required by the APA.
In all other matters of statutory interpretation and construction courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity. In an agency case, as with all other cases, there is a best reading of the statute all the same—“the reading the court would have reached” if no agency were involved should be the only permissible interpretation of that statute.
The Chief would refer to Chevron’s presumptions as “misguided” given that agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguity. Courts do.
One of the most common arguments in favor of the need for Chevron Deference is that agencies should resolve these statutory ambiguities because agencies have subject matter expertise regarding the statute they administer. This ostensibly promotes the uniform construction of federal law.
Furthermore, because statutory ambiguities can involve policymaking, the argument goes, those decisions are best left to political actors. But the Chief would reject any such suggestions outright, noting that “Congress expects courts to handle other technical statutory questions”—furthermore the courts have the benefit of briefings from those very parties and other friends of the court. This means in an agency case, the reviewing court can go about its task of interpretation with the agencies body of experience and informed judgement at its disposal.
Finally, the view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions amounts to policymaking is especially mistaken because it rests on a profound misconception of the judicial role. Legal interpretation does not suddenly become policymaking just because there is an agency empowered to act as policymakers.
The Chief adroitly sums up the forty year evolution of Chevron Deference by noting that:
At best, Chevron has been a distraction from the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action? And at worst, it has required courts to violate the APA by yielding to an agency the express responsibility, vested in “the reviewing court,” to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” §706 (emphasis added). Pp. 26-29.[3]
Next, the court dealt with the argument that Chevron should continue to be upheld because stare decisis…. As though that’s an argument. If the Court were to make itself such a slave to stare decisis, relying on it as their proximate guiding light in areas of law other than administrative law our nation would still have an official racial policy of separate but equal. And if Chevron’s forty years of stare decisis is itself an argument for continuing to propagate a legal fiction, what of the nearly 140 year provenance of Plessy v. Ferguson? The mind verily boggles when trying to rationalize arguments for such a cultish overreliance on case precedent.
In Loper Bright Enterprises, the chief is somewhat more analytical, noting that “the doctrine governing judicial adherence to precedent, does not require the Court to persist in the Chevron project.” If only Roberts could take this principled view, rather than his erstwhile pragmatic view of the usefulness of stare decisis a little more often. Given his and Kavanaugh’s judicial hive mind that would finally get us up to five actually committed originalists on the Court. But I digress… The Court turns to the precedent in Knick v. Township of Scott, noting that “the quality of the precedent’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established… and reliance on the decision”—all weight in favor of letting Chevron go.
He closes his opinion by putting an exclamation point on his summery as he notes:
Chevron has proved to be fundamentally misguided. It reshaped judicial review of agency action without grappling with the APA, the statute that lays out how such review works. And its flaws were apparent from the start, prompting the Court to revise its foundations and continually limit its application.[4]
Experience has shown that Chevron is fundamentally unworkable. Oddly enough, the defining feature of its framework has been the identification of statutory ambiguity, but the concept of ambiguity has always evaded meaningful definition.
Or as Justice Gorsuch succinctly put it during the oral arguments in Loper Bright “we have this ambiguous ambiguity trigger that nobody knows what it means.” Before noting the fact that many lower court judges will commonly express the fact that they have never come across such a statutory ambiguity in any case before them and other equally capable lower court judges will say they find them all the time.
Roberts goes on to reason that such an impressionistic and malleable concept cannot stand as an everyday test for allocating interpretive authority between the courts and agencies. And that over this forty year period the Court has been forced to clarify and modify this doctrine again and again, only adding to Chevron’s unworkability.
To the degree precedent is relied upon for its ability to create uniformity in the law, Chevron has never fostered any such meaningful reliance, given the Court’s constant tinkering with the doctrine and the fact that tinkering has left many lower courts to turn away from the doctrine entirely. Its hard to see how anyone could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chevron in any particular case, or expect it to produce readily foreseeable outcomes.
[R]ather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron affirmatively destroys them by allowing agencies to change course even when Congress has given them no power to do so.[5]
The only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion,” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265, is for the Court to leave Chevron behind.[6]
The Court does go on to say that overruling Chevron does not call into question prior cases that have relied on the Chevron framework. Noting that the holdings in those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the EPA’s Clean Air Act—which was the law at issue in Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council, are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite the Court’s change in interpretive methodology.
Additionally, the Court’s two great perennial critics of Chevron Deference, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch would join the Court’s opinion in full, but write their own additional concurrences as to the importance and relevance of the decision to sack Chevron.
Justice Thomas’ concurrence would begin by reiterating the majority’s primary holding, noting that such deference does not comport with the Administrative Procedures Act which, under
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.[7]
~5 U.S.C. §706
However, Justice Thomas writes to underscore a point not fully fleshed out by the majority opinion. That is that adherence to Chevron Deference violates the constitution’s separation of powers by allowing the executive branch to usurp both the legislative and judicial powers.
To provide “practical and real protections for individual liberty,” the Framers drafted a Constitution that divides the legislative, executive, and judicial powers between three branches of Government. Perez, 575 U. S., at 118 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Chevron deference compromises this separation of powers in two ways. It curbs the judicial power afforded to courts, and simultaneously expands agencies’ executive power beyond constitutional limits.[8]
Chevron compels judges to abdicate their Article III judicial power, which in its original understanding, according to the framers and ratifiers who gave our constitution legal force requires a court to exercise its own independent judgement in interpreting and expounding upon the law.
The Framers understood that “legal texts . . . often contain ambiguities,” and that the judicial power included “the power to resolve these ambiguities over time.” Perez, 575 U. S., at 119 (opinion of Thomas, J.)[9]
By tying a Judge’s hands, Chevron deference thus prevents the judiciary from serving as a constitutional check on the Executive, allowing the Executive to dictate the outcome of cases through erroneous interpretations.
But Chevron also permits the Executive Branch to exercise powers not given to it.
“When the Government is called upon to perform a function that requires an exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial power, only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.” Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 68 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).[10]
But, Thomas continues, Chevron does not just involve a usurpation of the judicial power. He notes that Chevron cannot be salvaged by casting it, as its defenders, both in the executive branch and the Judicial branch claim by recasting it as a deference to an agency’s “formulation of policy”[11]
Because if that were true it would mean “agencies were exercising legislative powers vested in Congress.”[12] By giving the force of law to agency pronouncements on matters of private conduct as to which Congress did not actually have an intent. Chevron permits a body other than Congress to perform that function that requires the exercise of legislative powers. No matter the gloss put on it, Chevron expands agencies’ power beyond the bounds of Article II by permitting them to exercise powers reserved to another branch of Government.
Chevron Deference was “not a harmless transfer of power.” Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Thomas, J.) (slip op., at 3). “The Constitution carefully imposes structural constraints on all three branches, and the exercise of power free of those accompanying restraints subverts the design of the Constitution’s ratifiers.”[13]
He closes his concurrence with one of my favorite Antonin Scalia quotables:
To safeguard individual liberty, “[s]tructure is everything.” A. Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (2008). [14]
Then soberly noting that although the Court finally ends their 40-year misadventure with Chevron Deference, its more profound problems should not be overlooked. Regardless of what a statute says, the type of deference required by Chevron violates the Constitution.
This is followed by an exceptionally elegant and powerful concurrence written by Justice Neil Gorsuch. He begins by noting:
In disputes between individuals and the government about the meaning of a federal law, federal courts have traditionally sought to offer independent judgments about “what the law is” without favor to either side. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).[15]
Before explaining how that would radically change in the mid-1980’s. Noting however, that with time, the error of the Chevron approach had become so widely appreciated that even the Supreme Court who invented this form of judicial deference has refused to apply it to a single case since 2016. He goes on to say “Today, the Court places a tombstone on Chevron no one can miss and returns judges to interpretive rules that have guided federal courts since the Nation’s founding.
On the matter of Stare Decisis, Justice Gorsuch notes:
[A] past decision may bind the parties to a dispute, but it provides this Court no authority in future cases to depart from what the Constitution or laws of the United States ordain. Instead, the Constitution promises, the American people are sovereign and they alone may, through democratically responsive processes, amend our foundational charter or revise federal legislation. Unelected judges enjoy no such power. Part I-B, supra.[16]
Relying on State Oil v. Khan and Franchise Tax Board of Cal. V. Hyatt that from time to time the court has found it necessary to correct past mistakes. Because when it comes to correcting errors of constitutional interpretation, the courts have stressed the importance of doing so, for they can be corrected otherwise only through the amendment process.
Stare Decisis is a Latin term, employed in law that roughly translates to: “Let wrong decisions of the Warren Court stand.”
He goes on to note that during the Warren Court, which, incidentally is the period pretty much every defender of Chevron cites as the last great tenure of a Supreme Court whom they tend to think got the role of the judiciary right that the Warren Court had an average of overruling an average of three cases per term. While noting that during his tenure on the Court the Court has overruled just an average of one to two cases every year. Making the salient point that it’s really not so much that defenders of Chevron really believe in strict adherence to Stare Decisis. More so that they believe in a strict adherence to stare decisis when to do otherwise would effect a ruling whose outcome they happen to agree with.
However, I believe Justice Gorsuch is entirely in the right here, and as I have in the past taken great pains to point out before this is a principled position with no favoritism towards outcomes. I for one, was completely in favor of the outcome in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). I entirely believe in a women’s right to choose as a matter of the most fundamental of all liberties, that of self-ownership and bodily autonomy. But Roe v. Wade had absolutely no constitutional moorings whatsoever, and so, while disliking the outcome I entirely endorse the Court’s decision to overrule Roe in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).
I say all this to say that, I completely understand people who take a pragmatic view to constitutional and statutory interpretation. If you think a law or a Supreme Court precedent should remain in place because you agree with the outcome, that’s a perfectly reasonable, debatable position to take. What bothers me is that so much of this debate is pragmatism disguised as principles. Even the staunchest defenders of strict adherence to Stare Decisis don’t believe in strict adherence to Stare Decisis and I am of the opinion it would be far more productive if they would just be honest and say what they really mean…
Ultimately this comes back to a point that runs as a theme throughout Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence. The primary purpose of a precedent should be to persuade, and poorly reasoned decisions should be less persuasive than others. Gorsuch also notes that it would be a mistake to read judicial opinions like statutes, which are adopted through a robust and democratic process, which often apply in all their particulars to all people. When judges reach a decision in our adversarial justice system it is based on the factual record and legal arguments the parties at hand have chosen to put forward. In other words, a court’s opinion is not a comprehensive code, just an explanation of a particular courts disposition.
Turning now directly to the question what Stare Decisis effect Chevron Deference warrants, each of these lessons seem to me to weigh firmly in favor of the course the Court charts today:
Lesson 1, because Chevron Deference contravenes the law Congress prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act.
Lesson 2, because Chevron Deference runs against mainstream currents in our law regarding the separation of powers, due process, and centuries-old interpretive rules that fortify those constitutional commitments.
Lesson 3, because to hold otherwise would effectively require us to endow stray statements in Chevron with the authority of statutory language, all while ignoring more considered language in that same decision and the teachings of experience.[17]
Ultimate Justice Gorsuch’s argument is one that further enforces Justice Thomas’ concurrence on the importance to separation of powers. Though Gorsuch goes on to emphasizes the importance of textualism and the original meaning of statutes. Even though many critics of textualism today will paint it as some new and reactionary form of legal interpretation, it has been the ordinary course for judicial interpretation throughout our Nation’s history.
As I have documented in many past videos and articles, Textualism has been the default means for interpretation of statutory law throughout the centuries of our combine Anglo-American jurisprudence going clear back to the establishment of the Assize Courts under Henry II around 1100 AD.
William Blackstone, who was the primary source for an understanding of the law for the men who would eventually become the framers and ratifiers of our Constitutional system of government held that:
[C]ourts have sought to construe statutes as a reasonable reader would “when the law was made.” Blackstone 59; see United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805).[18]
Justice Gorsuch speaks to this when he writes:
Today, some call this “textualism.” But really it’s a very old idea, one that constrains judges to a lawfinding rather than lawmaking role by focusing their work on the statutory text, its linguistic context, and various canons of construction. In that way, textualism serves as an essential guardian of the due process promise of fair notice. If a judge could discard an old meaning and assign a new one to a law’s terms, all without any legislative revision, how could people ever be sure of the rules that bind them?
~New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. 105, 113 (2019).
Were the rules otherwise, Blackstone warned, the people would be rendered “slaves to their magistrates.” 4 Blackstone 371. Yet, replace “magistrates” with “bureaucrats,” and Blackstone’s fear becomes reality when courts employ Chevron Deference. [19]
In all these ways, Chevron’s fiction has led us to a strange place. One where authorities long thought reserved for Article III are transferred to Article II, where the scales of justice are tilted systematically in favor of the most powerful, where legal demands can change with every election even though the laws do not, and where the people are left to guess about their legal rights and responsibilities. So much tension with so many foundational features of our legal order is surely one more sign that we have “taken a wrong turn along the way.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 607 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).[20]
Finally, we need to discuss Justice Kagan’s dissent. Justice Kagan, in her dissent, strongly disagrees with the Court's decision to overrule Chevron Deference. She argues that Chevron Deference is a longstanding and well-established principle that promotes stability, consistency, and expertise in agency decision-making.
Though the majority made clear the absurdity of this arguments when they noted:
Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal law justify Chevron. Given inconsistencies in how judges apply Chevron, see infra, at 30-33, it is unclear how much the doctrine as a whole (as opposed to its highly deferential second step) actually promotes such uniformity. In any event, there is little value in imposing a uniform interpretation of a statute if that interpretation is wrong. We see no reason to presume that Congress prefers uniformity for uniformity’s sake over the correct interpretation of the laws it enacts.[21]
Justice Kagan believes that Chevron Deference is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and the separation of powers. Though she never really provides an answer for why, if Chevron was consistent with the APA, they didn’t start interpreting the APA that way for the first 40 years of it’s existence, now why her understanding of the Separation of Powers wasn’t ever adopted by the Court between the years of 1789 to 1984.
She asserts that the Court's decision undermines the deference that agencies have traditionally been afforded in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Justice Kagan argues that Chevron Deference is necessary because agencies have the expertise and experience to interpret complex regulatory schemes and that their interpretations should be given deference unless they are unreasonable.
Though this too seems to ignore the fact that the majority recognizes the value of considering an agencies expertise in their briefs filed with the Court when the Court are reviewing matters of statutory construction to which these administrative agencies are a party. No one doubts the usefulness of considering their technical expertise as a persuasive authority to be given due consideration when the Court exercises their technical expertise in saying what the law is.
She criticizes the Court's decision for disregarding the practical benefits of Chevron Deference and for failing to provide a clear alternative framework for judicial review of agency interpretations. Justice Kagan warns that the Court's decision will lead to uncertainty, inconsistency, and increased litigation in administrative law.
Which is just bizarre as it overlooks the superfluous arguments in favor of Skidmore Deference, a doctrine established in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161 (1944).
The argument that Skidmore Deference is a viable replacement for Chevron, which, unlike Chevron, IS consistent with §706 —with the added benefit of not offending the Separation Of Powers Doctrine— Is an argument that has been made by pretty much everyone, at pretty much every stage of this case. This was the argument made by the herring fishermen who were the petitioners to this case, in the respective petitions for cert, as well as their legal briefs—and even during their oral arguments.
Furthermore, the viability of Skidmore Deference as a replacement for Chevron, consistent with §706 of the APA was a point made by numerous justices in the oral arguments for these cases, and hammered home repeatedly in this very opinion. To say the Court has offered no viable alternative is beyond bizarre.
She concludes that Chevron Deference is a valuable tool that promotes the rule of law and should be retained. Though it’s difficult to see how that argument could possibly suffice as one on which to try and rescue Chevron Deference.
As Justice Gorsuch responds to this argument in his concurring opinion when he says that:
If stare decisis calls for judicial humility in the face of the written law, it also cautions us to test our present conclusions carefully against the work of our predecessors. At the same time and as we have seen, this second form of humility counsels us to remember that precedents that have won the endorsement of judges across many generations, demonstrated coherence with our broader law, and weathered the tests of time and experience are entitled to greater consideration than those that have not. See Part I, supra. Viewed by each of these lights, the case for Chevron Deference only grows weaker still.[22]
Consider next how uneasily Chevron Deference sits alongside so many other settled aspects of our law. Having witnessed first-hand King George’s efforts to gain influence and control over colonial judges, as is so passionately decried in our Declaration of Independence, the framers made a considered judgment to build judicial independence into the Constitution’s design. They vested the judicial power in decision-makers with life tenure. Art. III, §1. They placed the judicial salary beyond political control during a judge’s tenure. Ibid. And they rejected any proposal that would subject judicial decisions to review by political actors. The Federalist No. 81, at 482; United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 786-791 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring).
All of this served to ensure the same thing: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal.” In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). One in which impartial judges, not those currently wielding power in the political branches, would “say what the law is” in cases coming to court. Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177.[23]
Links
Chevron v NRDC / Chevron Doctrine / Chevron Deference
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. at Wikipedia
Chevron deference on Cornell Law
Chevron Deference: A Primer - Congressional Research Service
Relentless Inc. v Department Of Commerce
Supreme Court likely to discard Chevron on SCOTUSblog
Relentless Inc. v Department Of Commerce Docket Page at SupremeCourt.gov
Relentless Inc. Petition For Cert at SupremeCourt.gov
Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo
Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo - Wikipedia
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo at SCOTUSblog
Magnuson-Stevens Act
Administrative Procedures Act
Administrative Procedure Act at Cornell Law
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. Subchapter II) at National Archive
Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at Congressional Research Center
De Novo Review
De Novo at Cornell Law
De Novo Judicial Review: Meaning, Overview, Types at Investopedia
Past Episodes
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[1] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *1 (June 28, 2024)
[2] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *1-2 (June 28, 2024)
[3] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *13-14 (June 28, 2024)
[4] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *14 (June 28, 2024)
[5] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *15 (June 28, 2024)
[6] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *15 (June 28, 2024)
[7] 5 U. S. C. §706
[8] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *63 (June 28, 2024)
[9] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *64 (June 28, 2024)
[10] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *64-65 (June 28, 2024)
[11] Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Thomas, J.)
[12] Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Thomas, J.) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Art. I, §1).
[13] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *66 (June 28, 2024)
[14] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *66 (June 28, 2024)
[15] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *67 (June 28, 2024).
[16] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *77-78 (June 28, 2024)
[17] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *83 (June 28, 2024)
[18] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *91 (June 28, 2024)
[19] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *91-92 (June 28, 2024)
[20] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *93-94 (June 28, 2024)
[21] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *49 (June 28, 2024)
[22] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *85-86 (June 28, 2024)
[23] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *89-90 (June 28, 2024)
My husband had a question about the Herring fisherman having to pay the regulators after the money for them to be there ran dry. Would this be in violation of the Quartering Amendment III?
While I know they're not soldiers, at the time Chevron was in play, they had pretty much "force of law" and the fishermen were obligated to pay for them being there at the time, effectively putting the fishermen out of $700/day, providing room and board and meals.
One could say it's 'stretching it a bit', though, could it also be interpreted this way as well?
Sorry if this sounds dumB. It was a thought last night, and thought I would ask anyway. 😁
I appreciate it, thank you!